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Risky Investment

— Theorizing housekeeper's disadvantageous human capital accumulation —

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Research Question

Why are housekeepers economically disadvantaged?

Perspective

Human Capital Theory: o Productivity gain with training o Doing is training Game Theory: o Threat point determines - Bargaining power - Payoff at non-cooperation

dea (England + Kilbourne 1990; Ott 1992)

Housework differs from paid work
Marketability / Liquidity
Risk of Demand-Declining
Implicit/Explicit Contract

Formalization required



Game of two players with no difference

except human capital investment

Settings Two players = { X, Y } Two periods:

o Altruism *Unitary* utility
o Specialization:
X for housework;
Y for paid work

o Bargaining for *own* utility - cooperate (c) or

- non-cooperate (d)

Threat point (during *B*)

= Utility in the case of non-cooperation

$V_{dX} < V_{dY}$ if housekeeper is disadvantaged.

Why?



Result of Investment:

X's human capital



Y's human capital



→ Bargaining in *B*

Threat points: Player's own utility in case of *non-cooperation*

$U_d (\frac{\text{Products}}{\text{X's advantage}}, \frac{\text{Income}}{\text{Y's advantage}})$

Demand Declining Difference in marginal utility of time:



Greater difference for *housework*?

Factors of Demand Declining

- Scale of economy: Housework produces luxury or necessity?
- Household composition: Who is at demand?
- Life-stage: e.g., Childcare
- Relation-specificity: Is special social-capital needed?

Housework vs. Paid Work

	Housework	Paid work
Reward	Direct consumption	Money
Boundary	Household	Whole market
Warranty	Normative altruism	Contract

Policy Orientations

 (1) Reformation of Family Laws for Marriage Contract

 explicit and enforceable

(2) Pinpoint measures e.g., Leave system for lifestage-specific tasks

