What Will We Witness When We Seriously Try to Boost Fertility?

—— Normative constraints against universal child benefits

→ So What?

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Is sociology useless?

Survey data analysis

Findings (about causality)

 IIDCM
Ideology-Institution Dynamics with Causal Modeling

Japan Sociological Society meeting

Sep 20 Waseda

http://tsigeto.info/15x

Glossary

CFR RpL
WLB UCB
PPR RE

Question

How to raise fertility up to RpL?

From policymaker’s view

Answer 1: Because people do not want
Women want to continue career: 30%
Women continuing career: 20%
Children (aged 1-2) in day-care: 30%

Data: National Fertility Survey 2010,

Answer 2: Fundamental limit in WLB effect
Model of equivalent income

\[ y(x) = \frac{wm + bx}{\sqrt{m + x}} \]

x: number of children  y: equivalent income  
\( s \): income when single and no child
\( b/s \): benefit per child
\( w \): WLB effect
\( m \): number of adult member in household

No incentive except 1st child for 2-parent with WLB

WLB justified by ideology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Rule</th>
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<tr>
<td>WLB is effective</td>
<td>CFR=2.08</td>
<td>Leave; Day-care</td>
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Ideal ideological feedback

More children
Balanced work-life
Sankei's proposal

Effective?
500,000 yen per child (3rd, 4th...) × 20 years
Incentive if b > 0.15
Income < 3 mil yen

How much does it cost?

Threshold: b = 0.83 (for 1-parent)
Sufficient level: 1.6 million yen/year (per child)
=About 0.4 × GDP per capita

Normative constraint 1:
Who is responsible to maintain child?
PPR: Parents’ primary responsibility to maintain children
Incompatible with UCB

Normative constraint 2:
Reproduction egalitarianism (RE)

Class Differentials

Probable scenario 1
High UCB and drastic changes of family
- Govt maintains children
- Social div of reproduction

Probable scenario 2
- Ineffective WLB
- Low fertility
- Unchanged family